Why was the Korean War a turning point in history of warfare in the 20th century

Why was the Korean War a turning point in history of warfare in the 20^th century?

Based on Neil Stewart The Changing Nature of Warfare (2001)

1914-45: Total War

For much of the 20^th century perhaps the distinguishing characteristic of warfare was the blurring of distinctions between civilian and soldier. From the first ‘total war’ of 1914-18 that mobilised whole populations and economies for the war effort, through the strategic mass bombing of civilians of which ‘Guernica’ seemed to be a moral turning point, to the guerrilla wars of liberation in South-East Asia in which civilians were also the soldiers, war in the 20^th century has given a prominent role to civilians. The concept of ‘total war’ was first used to describe WWI. For the first time a large proportion of civilians were mobilized for the war effort (e.g. UK DORA) and in addition they suffered rationing, deprivation and massive human loss. Yet, soldiers still did most of the fighting and dying. WWII ‘advance’ of technology alongside ideological and racial nature of the conflict resulted in a much greater proportion of war dead. WWI civilian dead 1:20 military deaths. WWII more than half were civilian: 60 000 Britons died in bombing raids, 400 000 each in Germany and Japan. All this nothing compared to the numbers killed in concentration camps. Auschwitz 10 000 a day. The USSR suffered most 20m deaths, 12 million civilians. 10 million Chinese died (nearly all civilians), many the victims of Japanese racial intolerance. In total 55 million deaths nearly 5 times the number killed in WWI.

WWI and WWII: similarities

Both ‘total wars’ dependent on industrial technologies, WWI involved people from 80% of countries of the world.

WWI and WWII: differences

(i) Scale of WWII, geographical scope of ‘theatres’ war. The dominant military technology, tanks, motorised transport had existed in 1914-18 but only realised full potential in WWII. (ii) This allowed change in tactics. WWII was a war of mobility, the potentiality of which had only briefly been shown at the end of the war e.g. Ludendorff Offensive March 1918. (iii) WWII war of ideology not just of competing nationalisms. Mutually exclusive ideologies that mobilized people to fight with intensity.

Cold War ‘limited war’

History often appears to be cyclical, repeating patterns of earlier times. There is something cyclical about the nature of warfare since 1945. Just as the ‘limited wars’ of kings like Frederick the Great in the 18^th century were a recoil from the unlimited all- consuming religious wars of the 17^th century, so the Cold War period appears as a response to the ‘ideological’ nature of the total wars of 1936-45 (49?). The policy of ‘Containment’ followed by the USA and NATO after 1947 was largely defensive and wars that were fought had clearly defined ‘limited’ objectives. When von Clausewitz said that ‘war is diplomacy by another means’ he was drawing attention the continuum that can make it difficult to distinguish between the two. In the 18^th century dynastic armies would seek to win diplomatic objectives without fighting battles; siege and manoeuvre would hopefully lead your enemy into exhaustion and capitulation. The ‘War’ of Bavarian Succession (1778-9) between two armies of 200000 men never met in battle. Nothing was more likely to cost a monarch his kingdom than a costly war and wars were therefore avoided at all costs. There was something similar about the Cold War, particularly after the USSR developed nuclear weapons in 1949. In 20^th century conflict, the Korean War (1950-53) marked an important turning point. The dismissal of Douglas MacArthur in April 1951, a man who had advocated the use of nuclear weapons against communist China, was recognition by President Truman that wars could be ‘limited’ rather than an ideological crusade. In the words of John W. Mason this ‘reflected the realities of international politics in the nuclear age’ (Mason: 23) Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) not only made warfare too risky to be seriously contemplated but ultimately as in the 18^th century it was the spiralling economic cost of the arms race which persuaded Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s to bring the Cold War to an end. As J. F. C. Fuller said of wars on an earlier epoch ‘Money, not blood, was the deciding factor’ (quoted in Neil Stewart: 14).